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Abstract
The article attempts to raise several distinctions regarding the presumed
relationship of social science research findings to social policy making.
The distinctions are made using Glymour's critique of the Bell Curve. An
argument is made that (1) social science models and research findings
are largely irrelevant to the actual concerns of policy makers and (2)
what is relevant, but overlooked by Glymour, is how ideological factors
mediate the process. The forms that ideological mediation may take are
indicated.
Although there have been a variety of attempts to understand how social science
research does or does not affect the "voices" of those being studied (Harding, 1993;
Longino, 1993), we wish to revisit the issue from another angle. What has been
overlooked in even the most ambitious constructivists' forays (Fuller, 1988) into
dominant epistemologies is why such research findings are, generally, so
overwhelmingly ineffective in social policy formulation. That is, we wish to consider
some of the deeply implicit notions of the "research act" (Denzin, 1989) itself; those that
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contribute to either the tacit acceptance of such knowledge production or generate
vociferous attacks (Lakatos, 1978) of various sorts. More specifically, our argument is
that social policy makers assume an atypical "gatekeepers" role where, in this case, they
must attempt to appropriate, translate, and filter social science research findings to
relevant publics; however, the very act of doing so is most likely doomed to fail. Those
who are then to "benefit" from the social policies, informed and enlightened by social
science findings, are the very ones whose voice often cannot be heard.
The issue is, to use Quine's (1969) overworked phrase, one of an "indeterminancy
of translation." It is not that a translation is impossible, however, but rather that some
thing is lost in the translation. What is lost is the subject of our analysis, including an
attempt to show—again borrowing from Quine (1960)—-that there is indeed a "fact of
the matter" about all of this, but an unexpected one. We will attempt to show how the
"translation" issue works by using the recent analysis of the well known philosopher of
science, Clark Glymour, to account for the relationship of social science research, to
social policy, to social practice. Specifically in his provocative article, "What went
wrong? Reflections on Science by Observation and The Bell Curve (1998:1-32),
Glymour recognizes the issues of evidence and policy relevant to both the philosophy of
science and social science and how they overlap into the ambiguous realm of public
policy- making. However, the need for additional analysis lies not only in the fact that
Glymour has not fully explored a series of mostly implicit, but very significant,
assumptions that are involved in social policy making, but also to illustrate that the
nexus of scientific thinking and the formulation of social policy often support
ideologically-based belief systems that selectively utilize "scientific" findings. Our aim
will be to illustrate how even a well-known philosopher such as Glymour falls victim to
the very trap he is trying to expose and avoid.
To begin with, Glymour's critique of the methodological (and in a deeper sense,
ontological) issues he raises concerning the analysis of The Bell Curve (1994) are
arguably some of the best made to date. The social sciences, Glymour argues, have been
plagued by the alleged importance of uncovering the causal mechanisms underlying
social behavior and practices. This is not a new problem. What is important, as he points
out, is the inability of the social sciences to acknowledge that these implicit causal
structures are highly complex, and being so, how they can produce contradictory
conclusions within a given research domain. The complexity of these causal structures is
often overlooked by social scientists because of implicit beliefs concerning the validity
of the methodological techniques themselves (Campbell, 1987). For instance, if a social
scientist can employ such relatively powerful quantitative techniques as multiple
regression, discriminate analysis, and factor analysis, there are usually two
corresponding beliefs that seem to come into play: (1) that such techniques take
precedence over "philosophical" beliefs concerning the nature of (and presumed
importance of) causality, and (2) the use of such techniques, irrespective of their
ability—or lack of—to uncover true causal structures, still improves the claims that can
be made about social behavior over-and- above what could be said in their absence.
Again such debates, as Glymour correctly points out, mistake the importance of clear
causal thinking with the technical application of methods.
He states the issue (p. 1):
Social statistics promised something less than a method of inquiry that is
reliable in every possible circumstance, but something more than sheer
ignorance; it promised methods that, under explicit and often plausible
circumstance, converge to the truth, whatever that may be, methods whose
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liability to error in the short run can be quantified and measured.
Glymour further correctly points out (pp. 2-3) that social scientists are still under
the sway of a certain form of positivism that is suspicious of causal analysis itself. For
him, there is a solution: "Clear representation by directed graphs of causal hypotheses
and their statistical implications, in train with rigorous investigation of search
procedures, have been developed in the last decade in a thinly populated intersection of
computer science, statistics and philosophy" (p. 3). However, even this solution,
potentially elegant as it is, in our view, will not provide the needed framework for
rational social policy making. We will try to address why this is so in the sections that
follows.

I.
To put the issue rather crudely, for those engaged in the policy making process
what Glymour envisions, "just doesn't matter!" What we mean by this is that in social
policy making, at many levels and across a variety of contexts, the discovery and
justification of elegant (or even elementary) causal processes is largely irrelevant to the
decisions made by policy makers. Part of the problem, to begin with, is the fact that
there is what we will call an "ontological bifurcation" between social scientists and
policy makers (who are usually not social scientists). These two groups—at least based
on our own experiences—simply view the "world" in different ways, and often in such
fundamentally different ways, that although they want to communicate often they cannot
because, ultimately, they are unable to do so. While the story of why this is so is rather
complex, Fuller's attempt to explain it is relevant here. He wrote (1988), for example,
Unfortunately, as our remarks were meant to suggest, the crucial
epistemological differences occur at the level of the different textual
embodiments, since a popularization of quantum mechanics offers the lay
reader no more access to the work of the professional physicist than a
state-of-the-art physics text offers the professional physicist access to the
general cultural issues which interest the lay public. [His emphasis.](p. 272)
There are indeed different "textual embodiments" that are at the heart of the
issues, but for us the policy maker-as-gatekeeper role is the crucial one to consider. This
role serves as the principle "translator" one, mediating between the social
scientist-as-researcher and the voices of specifically involved publics. In contrast with
Fuller, however, we see the issue as primarily "ontological", although heavily
conditioned by the epistemological. By this we mean, the issue of increased
technique-sophistication, along with the causality issue, is believed to be necessary (and
possibly sufficient) for an increasingly satisfactory and accurate
"ontological-representation" of what social science research findings can do. We are
suggesting, on the other hand, that the very belief in what social science can do for social
policy making is at the center of differing views of (social) reality between these two
groups, leaving aside the affected publics. One initial way of capturing the difference is
to begin with a few "themes" about evidence that figure into the debate but are often not
explicitly indicated as such. These themes are fundamentally about what constitutes
"good" evidence for (eventually) the making of "good" policy, or about how differing
textual embodiments come about.
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Theme 1: "What is your evidence?"
From the policy maker's side of the ontological divide, the pressing issue is to be
able to "take and use" the evidence of social science research, with methodological
finesse(ness) be damned. Moreover, this is often the case for policy makers who are
trained as social scientists. The issue of the evidence theme takes various forms.
Perhaps, the most central one centers around the following distinction: "What evidence
counts?" vs. "What counts as evidence?" The distinction is one with a difference, as we
see it. Taking the latter one first, what counts as evidence includes a large class of
possibilities, such as empirical and non-empirical (i.e., qualitative), historical, legal data,
and so forth (Miller & Safer, 1993). Any of these types of evidence may be deemed to be
relevant by the policy maker in terms of formulating, implementing or evaluating a
given social policy. (Note 1) The issue is not trivial since how it is addressed, and by
whom, can determine a wide range of decisions affecting peoples lives in terms of what
voices they may or may not eventually have.
What is crucial to see, however, is how choices as to what does not count as
evidence automatically entail what evidence counts. Thus, if we reject the use of, for
example, ethnographic findings as evidence for a social policy issue, and our only other
choice is some type of empirical evidence, then the process of elimination dictates the
epistemological choice of what evidence counts. Here we may find a great deal of
variation: experimental vs. correlational findings, for instance, and both further
delineated by way of causal robustness. Moreover, each type of evidence may be further
distinguished by such factors as "weight" and "number". Thus, the "weight of the
evidence" may be a function of how "much" there is of it and how these concerns are
counterbalanced by "internal" factors such as sampling strategies and numbers,
parametric vs. non-parametric measures, the putative validity and reliability of measures
used, their "normal distribution", and so on.
All of these considerations need to be, but seldom are, taken into consideration by
the policy maker. Or, more precisely, even when they are their eventual impact on the
policy making process is usually minimal.
Theme 2: "Do you have a causal model?", or "Does your data give rise to or
support a pre-determined causal model?"
In many policy making scenarios, Theme 2 may or may not be related to Theme 1,
and this from either side of the ontological divide. Social scientists who serve as
(adjunct) policy makers in their role of "experts", based on our experience, seldom, if
ever, explicitly engage in discussions of the causal robustness or the efficacy of their
models. At best, such attempts are ad hoc; even where publication in empirical social
science journals is concerned, the issue of "causality" is usually given the obligatory
conceptual "nod" but then quickly forgotten. From the view of the non-social scientist
policy maker the issue is moot, since it is usually so far divorced from what needs to be
accomplished, it is perceived as irrelevant.
However, where a causal model could be specified with the precision argued for
by Glymour, the implications for policy making are probably not as dramatic as he
makes them out to be. Consider his two models (pp. 16-18, figures 12 and 13,
respectively) as examples.
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In (a), Herrnstein and Murray's (1994) model, IQ is the presumed cause of X (let's
say some outcome variable), and while Education may "intervene" or "mediate" the IQ -X relationship, something the social scientist would want to know, Glymour argues the
"answer" to (a) may be mistaken because of the inability to account for the possibility of
"U" in case (b). The "U" (e.g., "latent factors", other unknown "variables") may
themselves be correlated with X and Education and hence give a false picture of what is
presumed in (a).
Now, both (a) and (b) are examples of models that "count". Let's also assume that
(b) is somehow fully specified and with "U" accounted for the role of Education is either
enhanced or drastically reduced (i.e., in terms of explained variance). What is the social
scientist-as- policy maker and policy-maker-non-social-scientist to make of this for
policy purposes? The first may examine the total amount of variance explained (i.e., R2),
with or without the underlying causal structure, as not being that relevant. By this we
mean, the social scientist as policy maker may: (1) judge (b) to be a "better" causal
model because when "U" is taken into account the overall percentage of variance
explained in X is "greater" than in (a), (2) maintain faith in (a) because the amount of
unexplained variance (i.e., 1 — R2 ) has not been "sufficiently" reduced in model (b), or
(3) perhaps "go with" (a) or (b) depending on what "U" is determined to be. If U is
something like the mysterious "g-factor" for ability, as opposed to a more
"straightforward" variable such as, hypothetically, "Parental Attitudes", the decision may
be to stick with model (a) because it is putatively more amenable to policy making. On
the other side, the non-social scientist policy maker (even given some understanding of
the technical issues) still needs to know what to do—and (a) or (b) will not be very
useful here. Why not?
One reason is that the policy maker (perhaps of either variety) is
engaged—although most likely implicitly—in the formulation of a practical argument;
one, roughly, similar to Aristotle's (DeMotu Animalium, Ch. 7., Nicomachean Ethics
VU, 3:1 47a; VI, 2:113a, DeAnima III, II:1143b. (cited in Green, 1980:xvi) where the
conclusion of the argument is in the form of an "act", or here for the policy maker, "Do
X." In such a case, even a well formed argument with "true" premises is no guarantee
that a policy maker will take such an argument seriously (Miller and Safer, 1993). For
the policy maker, who happens to be a philosopher of social science, let us say, the
situation is even more desperate. Even with a fully specified model of the kind argued
for by Glymour, the philosopher-as-policy-maker will quickly recall the possibility of
radical under-determination (Quine, 1960). Conversely, if the model is so fully
specified, from a god's-eye point of view so that all possible (even incompatible) models
are somehow integrated into a meta-model, the situation for making concrete ("Do X")
policy decisions becomes exponentially worse because of the complexity (and, most
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likely, abstruseness) of the model. Ironically, if the super-model were to be "reduced" to
a simple, parsimonious and elegant one, its "simplicity" would argue against its
applicability to social policy concerns which now come to be viewed as "highly
complex" and beyond the "simplicity" of the model.
The ideas above may be further related in a general way with Glymour's (1980)
own notion of "bootstrapping." (Note 2) Even if we had a good, formal, and elegantly
simple model (theory) of, say, the determinants of income inequality (see Miller,
1987:237-242 for arguments against the bootstrapping issue which, perhaps, ought to be
the method-of-choice in showing how a causal-modeling framework is relevant to social
policy-making). For instance, assume that the State Superintendent of Schools has
evidence (in the form of standardized test scores used in the system) that there is a
"strong" (e.g., r = .70) positive correlation between test scores and the SES of schools,
i.e., SES and Achievement Test scores covary. From a bootstrapping perspective, we
might suggest that any of the models, such as the ones noted above, could in conjunction
with the evidence, be used to infer an hypothesis something like, "when controlling for
IQ the relationship between SES and Achievement Test scores will be substantially
reduced." Let us say this hypothesis is subsequently tested and IQ indeed does reduce the
relationship between SES and test scores. This goes on in different ways and the theory
is increasingly "confirmed"— in at least this sense of the elusive term (Achinstein,
1983). Bootstrapping would seem to be (if indeed it is increasingly supported) a
desirable consequence for the policy maker; but in fact it is not.

II.
While desirable, an increasingly well confirmed theory is ordinarily of little
pragmatic value for the policy maker. And this is not primarily due to the complexity or
theoretical "simplicity" of the theory, nor to a lack of reliability searches, or problems of
adequate statistical modeling, but rather to (1) the lack of a "logic" of policy
implementation given the nature of the indicators in causal-modeling approaches
themselves, (2) the lack of a clear "inference to the best explanation" model in which the
issues raised previously—what counts as evidence and what evidence counts—become
central, and (3) the lack of acknowledging the power of what we will call Ideological
Proclivities in determining the "meaning(s)" of (1) and (2).
The major problem with using social science methods and modeling to make
social policy is the failure to see that a type of "naturalistic fallacy" is involved, whereby
the "is", in this case of The Bell Curve, as well as other attempts, is believed capable of
being translated into the "ought" of policy making. To see this, some comments on the
three points above. First, one of the most difficult issues policy makers confront is the
implementation of indicators (as a part of formulating and implementing a policy) whose
"status" may be epistemically sound but ontologically problematic. And, the problem is
made worse as, paradoxically, we become more sophisticated in (as Glymour applauds)
the use of such techniques as factor analysis which are used to reveal complex
"underlying structures" or concepts. Thus, even with a non-problematic construct such as
SES, the policy maker is confronted with the issue of how to implement its effects. That
is, if SES is correlated with, say, IQ (a problematic construct), the policy maker must
decide if (a) the construct can be changed or altered in such a way that those who do not
have "enough" of it can obtain "more" of it or (b) if new social arrangements have to be
constructed wherein those who have "enough" or "too much" of it can be persuaded to
"share" it with others (e.g., social policy issues such as desegregation of schools through
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"bussing") who have "less" of it, or those who have "enough" of it are kept away from
those who do not because doing so (anticipating point three, ideology) is justified in
some way. Now multiply this one variable case with the type of sophisticated causal
modeling envisioned by Glymour and the problems increase accordingly.
The second issue related to the one just mentioned, is that of providing an
"inference to the best policy decision "based on conventional notions of inference to the
best explanation models (generally, Lipton, 1991). What is involved here is essentially
the need for "rules" of inference which operate in two directions. The first involves the
creation of a causal modeling theory which is the result of previous thinking and
perhaps partial testing of the various "paths" in the model. The complete model is then
tested further and claims about its efficacy as a model are put forth. In principle the
model (or parts of it) can then be taken as the framework for developing a social policy,
which then is tested. Both traditional "deductive" notions of theory use and Glymour's
bootstrapping would fall under this approach. Now, even granting the "status" problems
of the variables in the model as being capable of testing in some meaningful way, if such
testing does take place the conclusions about whether the policy has "worked" are still
problematic.
One problem of course is the adequacy of the testing procedures themselves, while
another one is how the evidence stands in relation to the model and to the policy that is
being evaluated. In another words, can the same evidence simultaneously constitute a
best-inference explanation to both? In many cases, the answer to both is no. In the first
instance, the way we often attempt to map the presumed causal relations of the model to
the "real world" are contrived, or at best, constitute a partial mapping. As Glymour
correctly points out, the way we "conditionalize" across different samples is crucial in
what one's measures do or do not show. But the point we wish to emphasize is that such
evidence, both in the "what evidence counts" and "what counts as evidence" senses, is
not necessarily the evidence that counts for the policy. For example, the finding that SES
and School Achievement do vary and are "explained" by IQ, let us say for the entire state
of California, is more of a way of "confirming" this assumed relationship in the model
than of formulating, implementing or evaluating a policy. That is, because of the nature
of policy making as a form of practical argument ("Do X"), even a high correlation of
model-specified variables is no guarantee of policy relevance in either the formulation,
implementation, or evaluation phases of policy making. Yet such evidence may be
strong confirming evidence for the model itself.
On the other hand, what counts as evidence might be given a broad definition for a
given policy irrespective of any causal modeling considerations, or perhaps more
accurately, incidentally of causal-model considerations. For example, the Superintendent
of Schools in a state is aware that the "literature" is strongly supportive of a
SES-IQ-School Achievement connection, and a similar pattern seems to be the case in
her own school system. She formulates a specific policy in which she believes the only
way to raise test scores (which are deemed "not acceptable") is to permit no one in
teacher training programs with an IQ of less than 115; remove teachers who score below
this; and significantly increase the salaries of present and future teachers who are or will
be at this level. Additionally, what counts as evidence for the policy (in its formulation
and implementation) may be a wide variety of "evidence" including previous empirical
and non-empirical studies, reports, anecdotal descriptions, philosophical arguments, and
so on. These same, or different, evidence sources may also be used to judge the
"success" of the policy in its evaluation phase. In this scenario, which by the way
actually often occurs, the inference-to-the-best-policy judgment is made on the basis of
non-causal model based evidence as instances of the inference to the best explanation
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(read "explanation" as "successful" policy). While all of these variations on the social
policy-causal modeling theme are relevant in varying degrees to the policy making
process, the most relevant one in our view is that of implicit or explicit ideological
preferences. How this issue works, and how even Glymour is not fully aware of its
power, will be described below. However, before this is addressed, some further brief
reflections on the points above may be in order.
Although not addressed by him specifically, we have found some of the recent
work by Searle (1988, 1995; also see Review Symposium on Searle, 1998) to be
especially useful in situating the social science research-social policy issue. In his
continuing analysis of intentionality, Searle (1983, 1998: 99-104) introduces the notion
of "conditions of satisfaction," a phrase which refers to the possibilities of judging a
large class of intentional states in terms of their propositional contents. Some intentional
states such as beliefs and hypotheses can be judged as true or false according to what
Searle refers to as their mind-to-world direction of fit. That is, these intentional states are
supposed to reflect the way the world is in terms of an independently existing reality. On
the other hand, intentional states such as desires and intentions have a different direction
of fit: a world-to- mind direction. Here, the issue is one of trying to make the world
correspond to what is believed about it (see also, Anscombe, 1959; Austin, 1962).
The interesting parallel to the policy making-social research issue is that the
direction-of-fit problem is actually counterintuitive to what one would expect. If we look
at Figure 1, Glymour and many social scientists would expect that the increased
sophistication of, especially, causal modeling processes will increasingly yield a true
mind-to-world fit [i.e., A]. And, indeed, while this may prove to be the case in some
ontologically- realist sense, it comes at the increased cost of having to demonstrate that
the world (in the policy making sense) is such, and, hence, we end up with C: trying to
fit the world to (again, in terms of policy making) what we believe it should be like on
the basis of what it is predicted to be.

Figure 1
On the other hand, the policy maker want the world to be like (b), but in trying to apply
A to it, she must argue for D. Both groups start out as "realists", in at least a broad
ontological sense, but end up as "idealists" in having to reconstruct the desired fit. What
results is a type of "reversed intentionality" where beliefs become desires, and desires
are fitted into the beliefs—a result where social policy which "fails" is not so much the
fault of the model itself but, ironically, of its sophistication. The double irony is that a
"simple" model, while "fitting" in both senses, may be rejected by both policy makers
and social scientists for this very reason. There is, however, another factor that needs to
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be addressed and we turn to this now.

III.
Glymour's article opening is entitled, "What went wrong...?" In effect nothing
went wrong! By this we mean the critical dimension in trying to understand the
relationship between social science causal-modeling and social policy is how the
"variable" of ideological preference enters into the equation. The importance of "U" (p.
18) in Glymour's critique is not in some covert empirical variable influencing our model
making but rather how model-making is interpreted by way of ideological preferences
and proclivities. It is this "variable" that ultimately accounts for our constructions of
social reality (Searle, 1995).
The ideological factor is a world-to-mind problem of fit and does, of course, go in
both directions—those of social scientists as well as policy makers. Moreover, while the
ideological frameworks of those above may be implicit or explicit, there is yet another
"level" or group that comes into play here, namely those affected by the policy. What
"voice" these individuals obtain from the policies that are usually imposed on them is a
function of how well decisions affecting them are understood and the degree of political
action garnered for or against the policy. Knowledge of how the ideological factor
operates is further complicated by the fact that there are at least two methodological
stances one may take to characterize this process—a variety of the mind-to-world
problem. These possibilities are given in Figure 2.

Figure 2
The categories of "intervening" and "extraneous" are meant to be used as they are
in social research: an intervening variable as logically "fitting" between an independent
and dependent variable, and extraneous, as a variable separately influencing the
independent and dependent variables (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1981). For social research
and policy, the intervening variable example suggests that an ideological stance is taken
(by either social scientist, policy maker, on those directly affected) in such a way that
one views it as being compatible with the social policy. That is, the ideology becomes

9 of 15

the justification for the policy; it is a filter which translates the findings into acceptable
policy decisions. Thus, if one believes, as in the Bell Curve, that there are empirical data
which clearly support cognitive differences among racial and ethnic groups, that belief
system "intervenes" nicely between the research findings (and approach) and the policy
subsequently formulated. In the "extraneous variable" model, the ideological belief
system, let us say of the policy maker, is different because it admits of the possibility
that the policy maker may reject the research findings and yet maintain the efficacy of a
particular policy formulation. For instance, if SES differences are correlated with
performance on standardized tests, one may reject that they have a hereditary basis and
yet may find such results compatible with a "welfare state liberalism" or "educational
progressivism" social policy which would support a variety of educational interventions.
Moreover, even if the research indicated that racial or ethnic differences remained after
controlling for SES, one could still argue that the meaning of SES is "interpreted"
differently by different groups. Thus "income", for example, may be "equal" between
two groups, but one group utilizes income to invest in "cultural capital" than the other,
and it is this factor that makes the difference in test scores; again, an interpretation
ideological compatible with the categories above.
We are not suggesting, in some simplistic fashion, that ideological commitments
or preferences are always working as "biasing-filters", but only that they are an often
overlooked factor in explaining how social policies are formulated, implemented and
evaluated given social science research findings. Additionally, the ideological
proclivities of all directly or indirectly involved in policy making produce a variety of
conflations that are often overlooked in discussions of these issues. Thus, some feminist
epistemologists (Tyson, 1998) see their particular agendas, and the social policies
flowing from them, as being more (or only) compatible with "qualitative" research
methods—what counts as evidence and what evidence counts is ideologically
conditioned. In a similar way, entire ideological movements such as "constructivism"
(Cobb, 1994, Von Glaserfeld, 1995), while not being overtly hostile to empirical
methods, do come down on the side of "ethnographic" approaches.
How the ideological factor is prominent in Glymour's thinking can be made clear
when he states (p. 28):
Sensibly read, much of the data of The Bell Curve, as well as other data the
book does not report, demands a revived and rational liberal welfare state,
but instead the book ends with an incoherent, anti-egalitarian plea for the
program of right-wing Republicans.
We now know where Glymour stands ideologically, although it is an open
question if his political preferences were "caused" directly by the evidence, his reading
of it, or irrespective of both. It is probably the middle option of the above. On the same
page (p. 28) he berates The Bell Curve's assumptions that the decline of the two-parent
family is a factor in such things as low school performance. He may be correct in this,
but his citing of Murray (1984) to the effect that two parent families are in decline in
industrialized societies, does not tell us how or why the Murray evidence conforms to
his own causal-modeling structures. Does the evidence in Murray adequately account for
all the problems he has cited? If so, some passing mention of it could have been made.
Continuing on (pp. 27-29), Glymour makes a huge leap from the fact that
Herrnstein and Murray favor some form of privatized schooling to the "fact" that we will
end up with "Ku Klux Klan schools, Aryan Nation Schools... and more schools of
ignorance, separation, and hatred will bloom like some evil garden, subsidized by taxes"
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(p. 29). Before the quote here he uses the phrase, "The consequences are predictable."
How poor Modus Ponens is still abused! Where is there any evidence that privatization
has or will lead to such outcomes. There are several other instances in the remaining
pages (pp. 29-30) of the article where Glymour does seem to be aware of what evidence
counts or why it counts. For example,
He favors neither more decentralization or privatization of schools but rather
national standards, testing and funding.
He favors schools that are always open for children from 1 to 17, that can serve as
both centers of learning and safe havens, and says they are the "sane and
comparatively economical way to create and sustain a civil society."
He favors early intervention efforts as worthy and these can produce lasting
effects (contrary Herrnstein and Murray's conclusions) if "teachers are paid
reasonably." He also says not having his vision of infancy to young adulthood
quality schooling will result in higher "opportunity costs" than the 100 billion per
year cost he estimates.
He believes "over credentialing" (carried out by colleges and universities)
penalizes the potentially positive effects of various compensatory efforts (i.e.,
affirmative action programs).
Finally, Glymour gives us his complete policy vision (p. 30): "Here is an
alternative vision, one I claim better warranted by the phenomena Herrnstein and
Murray report: nationalized, serious, educational standards, tax supported day and night
care, a living minimum wage, capital invested in systems that enable almost anyone with
reasonable training to do a job well." He then concludes if policies advocated by such
conservatives as Gingrich and Gramm are instituted, we will end up pretty much a
nation like Honduras!
In brief, the "policy" recommendations Glymour is advocating are not
substantiated explicitly by any evidence that would count in their favor. And if there
were such evidence, he does not tell us of its adequacy in causal-modeling terms.
Ironically, Glymour's strong support for national standards is very close to what Hirsch
(1996) has recently, and somewhat persuasively, argued for—although we would not
equate Hirsch with being politically liberal. But the most telling phrase, we believe, in
all of this is the emphasized passage above; namely that from the same data presented by
Herrnstein and Murray, Glymour draws quite different conclusions—certainly an
interesting variant on the under-determination thesis.
Finally, so that we may not be misunderstood, we agree with almost all (except the
Honduras slam!) that Glymour is advocating. We are just saying that you can't get there
in the way the Glymour thinks you can. The "is" of causal-modeling processes in the
social sciences will not translate in the "Do X" of policy making. If Glymour does not
believe this, he ought to consider running for a local school board.

Notes
1. One may notice that the policy-making process involves at least these three stages.
Each may have an independent or sequential relation to the issue of social science
research findings as evidence.
2. Bootstrapping refers to the complexity of trying to adequately determine what
evidence and what type of evidence properly applies to the testing of theories. The
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"bootstrapping" means that the evidence is first connected with the theory and
both, then, are used to deduce the hypotheses of the theory. The general issue is
how theories are to be confirmed. Here, how do social science theories result in
social policy?
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